cation relate to argumentation, and a chapter on informal fallacies. Part IV consists of a series of essays presenting the characteristic features of reasoning in a variety of special fields: legal reasoning, argumentation in science, arguing about the arts, reasoning about management, and ethical reasoning.

There are exercises following each chapter, ranging from easy to difficult. The exercises tend to be open-ended. A teaching guide, presenting a brief rationale to the teacher of each chapter's approach and main points, and suggesting answers to the exercises, comes with instructors' copies.


A straight "informal logic" text, Argument is designed, by topics covered, by example and by exercises, to teach thoughtful reasoning and assessment of others' reasoning.

The first chapter introduces the realm of reason—the mechanics of argument, the ecology of argument, and criteria of good reasoning. Chapter two discusses fallacies of oversimplification and of "smokescreen". The third chapter treats language: the demands good argument makes of language, trading on words, and an interesting treatment of definition. Under the rubric "Authority", chapter four discusses not only experts and other sources of authority, but also ad hominem and the use of statistics. Chapter five is on generality: the logic of general statements, and generalizing, sampling, and polls and surveys. Chapter six covers Comparison: analogical reasoning in general, and historical and moral comparisons. The seventh and final chapter is on Cause—the idea of cause, causal arguments and causal reasoning.

Once or twice in each chapter there appears a "Quick Check"—a device which enables the reader to check his or her understanding of the material just read (answers are provided). As well there are examples at the end of each chapter which may be used as exercises. "Comments" rather than answers are provided for some of these. Thirdly, there are "applications", which may be used as exercises, projects or take-offs for discussions. The examples, found throughout the text, are many, non-artificial, and often taken from actual public discourse.

ANALYSIS OF PUZZLE

We received the following response to the Woods-Walton "Find the Fallacy" puzzle in the December 1978 (Vol. I, No. 2) Newsletter:

First of all, it seems to me that in order to commit a fallacy in reasoning, there must be some reasoning, either explicit or implicit, that is to say, one must have an argument. The "bus service" argument is, in effect, as it is originally stated, really two arguments—or perhaps more properly an argument and its counterargument. It starts with the citizens request (or demand) for more bus service in an outlying suburb. No argument. City Hall responds with Argument 1, which amounts to a denial of the request. The citizens counter with Argument 2.

In order to have a petitio, there would have to be a circle within one of the arguments—or else, one would have to have some sort of situation in which Argument 2 continued the reasoning of Argument 1. Here, however, that is not the case. So petitio principii does not seem, on the face of things, a plausible analysis of this example.

But what does? It seems to me that there are two possible approaches to take. First, that there is no fallacy—at least none detectible given the scant information supplied. Possibly some suppressed information could be brought forth to show, say, a Half Truth in City Hall's argument. But we can't say. A second approach seems better: There is a Contrary-to-Fact Argument in #2. It is always difficult to argue convincingly (and soundly) of what "would be" or worse "would have been" without a great deal of supportive material, which is not furnished here; even with such supportive material, the argument is usually weak at best.

Presumably (just a guess, since there could be many motives for such a decision) the transportation authority cut back on service because it was underutilized, if such transportation had originally been
greater than at present. Or possibly, a decision was made on presumed suburban reliance on automobile transport because of greater affluence that could have the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In any event, decisions are made, if not done out of negligence, for reasons. To decide between the two analyses, one would want to ask the reasons for the original decision for the present level of service. If City Hall made a potential usage study, the citizens are guilty of a Contrary-to-Fact fallacy. If no such study was made, there would not appear to be any fallacy—not as the argument is stated, in any event.

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BOOK REVIEW


Statement of Purpose. For Rescher, dialectic is the discipline of "disputation, debate and rational controversy." He says in the Preface that the book "explores a disputational approach to inquiry" and in the introduction that "the goal of this exploration is the development of a dialectical model for the rationalization of cognitive methodology--scientific methodology specifically included." (xii) It is "the communal and controversy-oriented aspects of rational argumentation and inquiry" which he wants to illuminate and to contrast with "the cognitive solipsism of the Cartesian approach." Accordingly, the first three chapters of the book present Rescher's account of dialectic—the basic outlines, as it were, of rational controversy; the last four chapters apply that account in a consideration of issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Table of Contents

One. The disputational background of dialectic: the structure of formal disputation.
Two. Some dialectical tools: burden of proof, presumption, and plausibility.
Four. Facets of "dialectical logic".
Five. What justifies the dialectical rational of probative rationality.
Six. A dialectically based critique of skepticism.
Seven. Evolutionary epistemology and the burden of proof.
Eight. The disputational model of scientific inquiry.

Special Features

****Ch. 1 presents a method for representing the structure of a "formal disputation" in which there are two participants: someone defending a thesis (the proponent) and someone challenging that thesis (the opponent). In this method, there are three fundamental moves: 1) categorical assertion (available only to the proponent); 2) cautious assertion (which is available only to the opponent and amounts to saying "P is the case for all that you have shown") and 3) provisoed assertion (which amounts to saying "P generally or usually or ordinarily obtains, provided that Q" and is available to either participant in combination with the categorical or cautious assertion of Q). Various "dialectical countermoves" are built up out of these fundamental moves and fairly complex courses of formal disputation can be represented thereby.

****Ch. 2 explains the concepts of burden of proof and presumption, orienting itself from the legal tradition. Roughly, to establish a presumption is to shift the burden of proof. These concepts, together with the concept of plausibility, are taken to be central in the adjudication of a disputation. As a result, "A shared procedure for the assessment of plausibility and the allocation of presumption thus emerges as a critical factor in dialectic.--indeed as one of the crucial presuppositions of rationality throughout the context of rational discussion."

****Ch. 3 "explores the doctrine that disputation and debate may be taken as a paradigmatic model for the general process of reasoning in the pursuit of truth". The root idea is that dialectic provides a method of "evidential cost-benefit analysis"—i.e., of testing the evidential support of ideas and theses.