arguments be established on the grounds of the intentions of the person putting forward the argument. Arguments, he says, are people's arguments; they are put forward in order to convince other people. People may intend either that their arguments provide conclusive reasons for what they are trying to demonstrate, or that they provide less than conclusive reasons. In the first case, an arguer's intentions establishes his argument as deductive. In the second case, they may make it inductive. A desirable consequence of this approach is that it provides for both good and bad arguments in each category. Most of the time, Poir thinks, we are able to tell what an arguer's intentions are, or were if we cannot, we must judge the argument "both ways".

This proposal does not strike me as very satisfactory. I am surprised that Poir, who says that he cannot accept "purportedly valid" as a definition of 'deductive argument', can rest content with an appeal to intention here. I have the following difficulties with his proposal:

1. Either there will be evidence for the arguer's intentions regarding conclusiveness in the wording of his argument, or there will not. In the first case, intentions and "purporting valid" or "involving a claim to validity" (Copi) will amount to much the same thing. There are numerous examples, as Poir admits, where wording is not helpful. After all, conclusiveness in the sense of logical entailment is a philosopher's concept, and even such English words as "must", "therefore", and "shows conclusively" will not provide a reliable basis for inferring that the arguer is claiming conclusiveness in the sense that the premises are supposed to logically entail the conclusion. If, on the other hand, we seek to avoid these difficulties with wording—making the author's sayso and that alone the criterion for determining his intention—we find ourselves unable to apply the distinction to many cases where authors are dead or absent. This is absurd if the inductive/deductive distinction is supposed to be a fundamental tool in the assessment of argument. We can, of course, look at the indeterminate arguments "both ways", as Poir suggests; but the more often we do this, the more often we are bound to wonder why all of logic should have been erected around this fuzzy distinction in the first place.

2. If we really take Poir seriously on the over-riding importance of intention, then we will have to accept the peculiar consequence that there are inductive arguments which are deductively valid, and deductive arguments which are inductively strong. For instance, suppose someone argues:

1. Either Levesque will be defeated at the next election, or he will win and call another referendum.
2. Since Quebecers are fond of Levesque, he will not be defeated at the next election.
3. Thus, there will in all likelihood be another referendum.

This argument is deductively valid, but the conclusion contains the tentative expression "in all likelihood". If the arguer is a
Only philosophers and logicians writing textbooks, but politicians, lawyers, housewives, historians, economists, psychologists, and others, may not realize that his statements contain a perfect disjunctive syllogism, which, of course, is deductively valid. (A perfectly sensible reason for such a person to take this view would be the fact that the first premise is by no means certain; sensing this, one might express his conclusion hesitantly.) Thus the intention will be 'inductive', despite the fact that the argument is deductively valid. This consequence seems counter-intuitive. Fohr might reply that we can assess an inductive argument by deductive criteria, and conversely, but: (a) his stress on intention suggests that he would not move in this direction, and (b) if he did, that in itself would cast doubt on the importance of the inductive/deductive distinction for practical criticism. If a deductive argument can be assessed by inductive standards, or an inductive argument by deductive standards, what is the point in calling them deductive or inductive in the first place?

3. Ordinary language is not nearly as strict with words like "conclusive" "shows", or even "deduce" as is philosophical and logical tradition. I think that this may be the explanation for Conan Doyle's description of Sherlock Holmes as a great master of deduction. We sometimes use "deduce" loosely enough so that it means more or less what is meant by "infer" or "conclude from". I might, in that sense, deduce from your irritable disposition that you are tired today. I doubt that Conan Doyle ever meant to claim that Holmes' conclusions followed with logical necessity from the bits of evidence he had.

Now I do not wish to propose here that ordinary language is entirely all right and that philosophers and logicians have been guilty of a pernicious distortion of it. The problem for Fohr is that the traditional notion of deductive logical validity or--as he puts it--"conclusiveness or necessary implication is one which philosophers and logicians have constructed. It requires, first, a concept of logical necessity, and second, a distinction between considerations of truth and those of the connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. All of us know from teaching experience that it can be very difficult to convey these notions to philosophically untutored people; in fact, some never succeed in grasping them. Who is missing something here--us, or them? As a philosopher who values my own education, I am of course inclined to think they are, but in view of the doubts of Dummett, Quine, Waismann, and others, there are some grounds for scepticism here. If arguers' intentions are to provide the basis for a distinction between deductive and inductive arguments which will be anything like the traditional one, those arguers will have to formulate their intentions with a knowledge of the difference between logical and empirical connection, and the distinction between considerations of truth and those of validity.

Now Fohr, like others interested in informal logic, wants to attend to real arguments put forward by real people. This means not