A Searchable Bibliography of Fallacies – 2016

HANS V. HANSEN

Department of Philosophy
University of Windsor
Windsor, ON
CANADA N9B 3P4
hhansen@uwindsor.ca

CAMERON FIORET

Department of Philosophy
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON
CANADA N1G 2W1
fioretc@uoguelph.ca

This bibliography of literature on the fallacies is intended to be a resource for argumentation theorists. It incorporates and supplements the material in the bibliography in Hansen and Pinto’s Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings (1995), and now includes over 550 entries. The bibliography is here presented in electronic form which gives the researcher the advantage of being able to do a search by any word or phrase of interest. Moreover, all the entries have been classified under at least one of 45 categories indicated below. Using the code, entered as e.g., ‘[AM-E]’, one can select all the entries that have been designated as being about the ambiguity fallacy, equivocation.

Literature about fallacies falls into two broad classes. It is either about fallacies in general (fallacy theory, or views about fallacies) or about particular fallacies (e.g., equivocation, appeal to pity, etc.). The former category includes, among others, considerations of the importance of fallacies, the basis of fallacies, the teaching of fallacies, etc. These general views about fallacies often come from a particular theoretical orientation about how fallacies are best understood; for example, some view fallacies as epistemological mistakes, some as mistakes in disagreement resolution, others as frustrations of rhetorical practice and communication. Accordingly, we have attempted to classify the en-
tries about fallacies in general under one of several possible perspectives, but a given classifications is only an indication of the approach taken in the work, it does not imply that the entry is not relevant to other perspective on fallacies.

If fallacy-research is not about fallacies in general, it is about particular fallacies (e.g., equivocation, secundum quid, etc.), or particular kinds of fallacies (e.g., mathematical fallacies). We have decided on some 40 categories for classifying individual fallacies. There are also some other particular useful categories; for example, one indicating that the entry is devoted to a historical treatment of fallacies, the other an index of other bibliographies on fallacies.

This is a work in progress which will lend itself to correction in future versions by those who make use of it. We sincerely hope that readers will bring to our attention any of the mistakes in the present version. The kinds of mistakes we anticipate are: (i) mistakes in an entry (author(s), title, medium, date, pages, etc.); (ii) the inclusion of something that should not be in this bibliography; (iii) the failure to include something that should have been included in the bibliography; (iv) a mis-classification of an entry; and (v) a failure to add a useful classification code to an entry. (An entry can have more than one index code.)

For their help in developing the present version of the bibliography, we are very grateful to Andrew Aberdein, Maurice Finocchiaro, and Ralph H. Johnson.

### Coding key – Code to Subject

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSPECTIVES ON FALLACIES</th>
<th>GF-N</th>
<th>Fallacies (theory) in general / no evident perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GF-C</td>
<td>Fallacy taxonomies / classification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-D</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – dialectical / dialogical perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-E</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – alethic / logical / epistemic perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-F</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – formal (logic) perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-T</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – pedagogical perspective / issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-R</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – rhetorical perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-P</td>
<td>Fallacies (theory) – sociological-gender-psychological perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF-V</td>
<td>Fallacies (fallacy theory) – virtue/vice perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PARTICULAR, OR KINDS OF, FALLACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>(Fallacious) Appeals to authority (includes fallacious ad verecundiam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Ad baculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Ad consequentiam (fallacious appeal to consequences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Accent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-N</td>
<td>Ad hominem in general / no discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-A</td>
<td>Ad hominem abusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-C</td>
<td>Ad hominem circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-L</td>
<td>Ad hominem Lockean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-Q</td>
<td>Ad hominem <em>tu quoque</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Ad ignorantiam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-A</td>
<td>Ambiguity – Amphiboly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM-E</td>
<td>Ambiguity – Equivocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Collection. Includes papers/chapters on fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Base rate fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>Textbook with significant attention to fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BQ</td>
<td>Begging the question / Circular reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Composition / combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Division (parts and words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Faulty analogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB</td>
<td>Biased sample / Biased reasoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Causal fallacies (post hoc, false cause, common cause)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>False disjunction (dichotomy, alternatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Formal fallacy / fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Genetic fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Intentional fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICULAR, OR KINDS OF, FALLACIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FK</td>
<td>Conjunction fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Mathematical fallacy / fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Naturalistic fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FQ</td>
<td>Many questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Gambler’s fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX</td>
<td>Gender related fallacy / fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HG</td>
<td>Hasty generalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIS</td>
<td>Historical studies – modern work on historical expositions of fallacies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Ignoratio elenchi / Strawman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Ad misericordiam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>Other fallacy bibliographies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Ad populum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Shifting the burden of proof illicitly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ScF</td>
<td>Scope fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQ</td>
<td><em>Secundum quid</em> (fallacies dependent on qualifications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Slippery slope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Statistical fallacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>Cannot classify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YY</td>
<td>Should not be included in this bib</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALTA Proceedings:** *Proceedings of the NCA/AFA (National Communication Association/ American Forensic Association) Summer Conferences on Argumentation held at Alta, Utah, can be accessed through*  


ISSA Proceedings: The conference proceedings of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) can be accessed through the following works.

ISSA 1 Argumentation: Across the Lines of Discipline.
ISSA 1A Argumentation: Perspectives and Approaches
ISSA 1B Argumentation: Analysis and Practices.


ISSA 3A Perspectives and Approaches. (vol. 1)
ISSA 3B Analysis and Evaluation. (vol. 2)
ISSA 3C Reconstruction and Application (vol. 3)
ISSA 3D Special Fields and Cases (vol. 4)


OSSA Proceedings: The collected proceedings of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) can be accessed through the http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/.


A Searchable Bibliography of Fallacies, 2016
HANS V. HANSEN & CAMERON FIORET


—, 2013, “Fallacy and argumentational vice,” OSSA 10. [GF-V]
—, forthcoming, “The vices of argument,” Topoi [GF-V]


—, 1997, “If the base rate fallacy is a fallacy, does it matter how frequently it is committed?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20: 774-5. [BR]


AIKIN, SCOTT, and JOHN CASEY, 2013, “Don’t feed the trolls: straw men and iron men,” OSSA10. [IE]
—, forthcoming, “Straw men, iron men, and argumentative virtue,” Topoi, [IE]

BACHMAN, JAMES, 1995, “Appeal to authority,” In Hansen and Pinto, 1995, 274-86. [AA]


BALL, ANDREW, forthcoming, “Are fallacies vices?” *Topoi*, [GF-V]


BATTERSBY, MARK, and SHARON BAILIN, 2011, “Fallacy identification in a dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking,” *OSSA* 9. [GF-T] [GF-D]


BLAIR, J. ANTHONY, 1995, “The place of teaching informal fallacies in teaching reasoning skills or critical thinking,” in Hansen and Pinto 1995, 328-38. [GF-T]


BOGER, GEORGE, 2003, “Formal logic’s contribution to the study of fallacies,” *ISSA 5*: 133-7. [FF]


BONDY, PATRICK, 2016, “Bias in legitimate *ad hominem* arguments,” *OSSA 11*. [AH-N] [FB]


COHEN, L. JONATHAN, 1979, “On the psychology of prediction: whose is the fallacy?” *Cognition*, 7: 385-407. [GF-P]


__, 2007, “Mediated Fallacies,” ISSA 6: 265-9. (Some fallacies are dependent on the medium in which they occur.) [XX]


__, 2004, “Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological investigation,” Argumentation, 8: 427-44. [FA]

__, 2010, *Rethinking the BSE Crisis: A Study of Scientific Reasoning under Uncertainty*, Dordrecht: Springer. [AH-N] [AI] [AA] [BQ] [FA] [IE]
__, 2013, “Circular reasoning in public health,” *Cogency*, 5: 35-76. [BQ]
__, 2013, “Public health reasoning: Much more than deduction,” *Archives of Public Health*, 71: 25. [AI] [AA] [BQ] [FA]
__, 2015, *Reasoning and Public Health: New Ways of Coping with Uncertainty*, Dordrecht: Springer. [AI] [AA] [BQ] [FA]


Drehe, Ioian, 2016, “Fallacy as vice and/or incontinence in decision making,” *ECA* vol 2: 407-16. [GF-V]


__, 2016, “What difference between fallacy and sophism,” *OSSA* 11. [GF-N] [GF-C]


__, 2015, “The disguised ad baculum fallacy empirically investigated – strategic maneuvering with threats,” ISSA 8: 1396-1407. [AB]

van Eemeren, Frans H., Bart Garssen, Erik C.W. Krabbe, A. Franciska Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. Wagemans, 2014, “Classified Bibliography,” in (by the same authors) Handbook of Argumentation Theory, Dordrecht: Springer. (See especially the bibliographies connected to chs. 1-3, 6.) [OB]

__, 2005, “This can’t be true, that would be terrible: Ordinary arguers judgments about ad consequentiam fallacies,” in ALTA 13: 669-75. [AC]


__, 2009, Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness. Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules, Dordrecht: Springer. [GF-D]

__, 2012, “The disguised abusive ad hominem empirically investigated: Strategic maneuvering with direct personal attacks,” Thinking & Reasoning 18: 344-64. [AH-N]


__, 1987, “Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective,” Argumentation, 1: 283-301. [GF-D]


__, 1993, “Fallacies in a pragma-dialectical perspective,” in ALTA 8: 179-87. [GF-D] [OB]
__, 1993, “The history of the argumentum ad hominem since the seventeenth century,” In Krabbe et al., 1993: 49-68. [AH-N] [HIS]
__, 2004, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Especially, Ch. 7) [GF-D]


__, 2009, “How should one respond to fallacious moves?” Argumentation and Advocacy 45: 198-206. [GF-D]


____, 1991, “Understanding, finally, what it is to "beg the question,” *Metaphilosophy*, 22: 251-64. [BQ]


**Freeman, James B.**, 1995, “The appeal to popularity and presumption by common knowledge,” In Hansen and Pinto 1995, 265-73. [AM-A]


—, 1983, “Who says there are no fallacies?” *Informal Logic*, 5: 2-10. [GF-E]


—, 2007, “Considering questions about questions,” in Hansen and Pinto 2007, 171-86. [FQ]


HARMAN, OREN, 2012, “Is the naturalistic fallacy dead (and if so, ought it be?)” J. of the History of Biology, 45: 557-72. [FN]


HINTIKKA, JAAKKO, 1987, “The fallacy of fallacies,” Argumentation, 1: 211-38. [BQ] [FQ] [GF-D]

HITCHCOCK, DAVID, 1992, “Relevance,” Argumentation, 6: 251-70, [Includes section devoted to the relevance of "ad" appeals]. [GF-N]


_, 1995, “Do the fallacies have a place in the teaching of reasoning skills or critical thinking?” In Hansen and Pinto 1995, 319-27. [GF-N]


Hooke, A. E., 1991, “Tortuous logic and tortured bodies. Why is the ad baculum a fallacy?” In ISSA 2: 391-6. [AB]


IKUENOBE, POLYCARP, 2002, In search of criteria for ‘fallacies’ and ‘begging the question,’” Argumentation, 16: 421-41. [BQ]


__, 1994, “Many questions begs the question (but questions do not beg the question),” Argumentation, 8: 283-9. [FQ]


__, 1989, “Fallacies are common,” Informal Logic, 11: 101-06. [GF-N]

__, 2011, “Does virtue epistemology provide a better account of the ad hominem argument? A reply to Christopher Johnson (2009),” Philosophy, 8: 695-719. [AH-V]


KARY, DAVID, 2013, “Commentary on: Juhani Rudanko’s ‘Identifying a new type of fallacy in political discourse’,” OSSA 10. [XX]


Kimball, Robert H., “What’s wrong with *argumentum ad baculum*? Reasons, threats, and logical norms,” *Argumentation*, 20: 89-100. [AB]

Kirwin, Christopher, 1979, “Aristotle and the so-called fallacy of equivocation,” *Philosophical Q.*, 29: 35-46. [AM-E] [HIS]


Korb, Kevin, 2004, “Bayesian informal logic and fallacy,” *Informal Logic*, 24: 41-70. [AH-N] [AM-A] [FF] [SF] [PP]


__, 1993, “Reasonable argument and fallacies in the Kok-Stekelenburg debate,” In Krabbe et al. (eds.) 1993, 81-101. [GF-N]

__. 1996, “Can we ever pin one down to a formal fallacy?” in Johan van Benthem, FransH. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Frank Veltman (eds.), Logic and Argumentation, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 129-141. [FF]


__. 2007, “Nothing but objections!” in Hansen and Pinto 2007, 51-63. [Discusses the “fallacy of objection” and the “converse fallacy of objection”]. [GF-D]

__. 2007, “Commentary on Trudy Govier: ‘Two is a small number: False dichotomies revisited,’” OSSA 7. [FD]


KRABBE, ERIC C. W., and DOUGLAS N. WALTON, 1994, “It’s all very well for you to talk! Situational disqualifying ad hominem attacks,” Informal Logic, 15: 79-91. [AH-N]


LEDDY, THOMAS, 1986, “Is there a fallacy of small sample?” Informal Logic, 8: 53-6. [FB]


___, 1984, “Confirmation of a conjecture of Peter of Spain concerning begging the question,” *J. of Philosophical Logic*, 8: 117-33. [BQ] [HIS]


MAIER, ROBERT, 1987, “Cognitive development and fallacies,” in ISSA 1B: 75-82. [GF-P]


MARSHALL, ERNEST, 1987, “Formalism, fallacies, and the teaching of informal logic,” In ISSA 1B: 386-93. [GF-E] [FF] [GF-T]

MASSEY, GERALD, 1975, “Are there any good arguments that bad arguments are bad?” Philosophy in Context, 4: 61-77. [GF-E]

_, 1975, “In defense of the asymmetry,” Philosophy in Context (Supplementary), 4: 44-55. [GF-E]


McPECK, JOHN, 1991, “What is learned in informal logic courses?” Teaching Philosophy, 14: 25-34, [Criticism of the purported value of teaching the fallacies as part of critical thinking]. [GF-T]


MISSIMER, CONNIE, 1998, “Do the fallacies you favour retard the growth of knowledge?” OSSA 2, [GF-N]
MIZRAHI, MOTI, 2010, “Take my advice—I am not following it: ad hominem arguments as legitimate rebuttals to appeals to authority,” Informal Logic, 30: 435-56. [AA]


NELSON, LEONARD, 2016, A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies, trans. by Fernando Leal and David Carus, Cham, Switzerland: Springer. [AM-E] [FD]


PAGLIERI, FABIO, 2016, “Don’t worry, be gappy! On the unproblematic gappiness offallacies,” OSSA 11. [GF-N] [GF-E]


PAPRZYCKA, KATARZyna, 2014, “On a neg-raising fallacy in determining enthymematicity: She did not believe or want...,” Metaphilosophy, 45: 96–119. [XX]


PILGRAM, ROOSMARYN, and LEAH E. POLCAR, 2007, “Questioning the fallacy of many questions,” ISSA 6:1059-63. [FQ]


RIBEIRO, BRIAN, 2008, “How often do we (philosophy professors) commit the straw man fallacy?” Teaching Philosophy, 31: 27-38. [IE] [GF-T]


__, 2009, “Two accounts of begging the question,” OSSA 8. [BQ]
ROBINSON, RICHARD, 1941, “Ambiguity,” Mind, 50: 140-55. [AM-E] [AMBIG.]
_ , 1942, “Plato's consciousness of fallacy,” Mind, 51: 94-114. [GF-N] [HIS]
ROHATYN, DENNIS, 1987, “When is a fallacy a fallacy?” in ISSA 1B: 45-55. [GF-N]
RUDANKO, JUHANI, 2009, “Reinstating and defining ad socordi-
ami as an informal fallacy: A case study from a political de-
bate in the early American republic,” OSSA 8. [XX] [HIS]
_ , “Identifying a new type of fallacy in discourse,” OSSA 10. [XX]
SAHLANE, A., 2012, “Argumentation and fallacy in the justifica-
tion of the 2003 War on Iraq,” Argumentation 26: 459-88. [AH-A] [AH-C] [AB] [AC]
_ , 1977, “The fallacy of begging the question: A reply to Bark-
_ , 1981, “Superfluous information, epistemic conditions of in-
ference, and begging the question,” Metaphilosophy, 12: 145-
58. [BQ]
SCHEDLER, GEORGE, 1988, “The argument from ignorance,” In-
ternational Logic Review, 11: 66-71. [AI]
SCHELLENS, P. I., 1991, Ad verecundiam and ad hominem argu-
ments as acceptable fallacies, in ISSA 2: 384-90. [AA] [AH-
N]
SCHLECHT, LUDWIG F., 1991, “Classifying fallacies logically,” Teach-
ing Philosophy, 14: 53-64. [GF-C]
SCHMIDT, MICHAEL F., 1986, “Fallacies: A bibliography in pro-
gress,” Informal Logic, 8: 105-11. [OB]
_ , 1986, “On classification of fallacies,” Informal Logic, 8: 57-
66. [GF-C]
_ , 1991, “Inconsistency, falsity, incompleteness, begging the ques-
tion and missing the point,” in ISSA 2A: 403-10. [BQ]


__, 1999, “Augustus de Morgan on fallacy: pettyfoggers and controversialists,” *OSSA* 3. [GF-E] [HIS]


Shaffer, Michael J., 2007, “The *ad verecundiam* fallacy and appeals to expert testimony,” in *ISSA 6*: 1265-9. [AA]


Soudér, Lawrence, and Furrah Qureshi, 2012, “*Ad hominem* arguments in the service of boundary work among climate scientists,” *J. of Science Communication*, 11:1–11. [AH N]


SUBER, PETER, 1994, “Question-begging under a non-foundational model of argument,” Argumentation, 8: 241-50. [BQ]


TENTORI, KATYA, and VINCENZO CRUPI, 2012, “How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: some remarks on Schupbach (2009),” Synthese, 184: 3-12. [FK]


_., 2007b, Fallacies and Argument Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [GF-N] [BT]


VATE, DWIGHT VAN DE, JR., 1975a, “The appeal to force,” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 8: 43-60. [AB]


VEBER, MICHAEL, 2012, “‘People who argue *ad hominem* are jerks’ and other self-fulfilling fallacies,” *Argumentation*, 26: 201-12. [GF-N]


WAGEMANS, JEAN, 2003, “Conceptualizing fallacies: The Informal Logic andPragma-Dialectical approaches to the argumentum *ad ignorantiam*,” *ISSA* 5: 1049-51. [GF-D]


WALTON, DOUGLAS N., 1977, “Mill and De Morgan on whether the syllogism is a *petitio*,” *International Logic Review*, 8: 57-68. [BQ] [HIS]

__, 1980, “Petitio principii and argument analysis,” In Blair and Johnson 1980, 41-54. [BQ]


__, 1991a, Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic of Argumentation, New York: Greenwood. [BQ]
__, 1996, Arguments from Ignorance, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. [AI]
___, 1997, Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. [AA]
___, 1998, Ad Hominem Arguments, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. [AH-N]
___, 1999, “The appeal to ignorance, or argumentum ad igno- rantiam”, Argumentation, 13: 367-77. [AI]
___. 2000, “Use of ad hominem argument in political discourse: the Battalino case from the impeachment trial of President Clinton,” *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 36: 179-95. [AH-N]
___, 2002, “The sunk costs fallacy or argument from waste,” *Argumentation*, 16: 473-503.[XX]
___, 2010, “Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are,” *Informal Logic*, 30.2: 159-84. [GF-N]
___, 2013, *Methods of Argumentation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Ch. 8) [GFN]


WALTON, DOUGLAS, and MARCIN KOSZOWY, 2015, “Two kinds of arguments from authority in the ad vercundiam fallacy,” ISSA 8: 1483-92. [AA]

WALTON, DOUGLAS N., and ERIK C.W. KRABBE, 1995, Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning, Albany: State University of New York Press. [Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss dialectical shifts and fallacies]. [GF-D]


__, 1993, “Comment on Peter of Spain, Jim Mackenzie, and begging the question,” J. of Philosophical Logic, 22: 323-31. [BQ] [HIS]
WONG, WAI-HUNG, and ZANJA YUDELL, 2013, “How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?” *Philosophical Studies*, 165: 221-7. [AC]

WOODS, JOHN, 1980, “What is informal logic?” in Blair and Johnson 1980, 57-68. Also in Woods and Walton 1989, 221-32, [Investigates the formal approach to some fallacies, especially composition and division]. [GF-E][FF]

—, 1987, “Ad baculum, self-interest and Pascal's wager,” in *ISSA 1*: 343-9. [AB]


—, 1994, “Is the theoretical unity of the fallacies possible?” *Informal Logic*, 16: 77-85. [GFN]


__, 2009, “Knowledge by telling: reflections on the ad veruncudiam,” OSSA 8. [AA]

__, 2010, The Death of Argument: Fallacies in Agent-Based Reasoning, Amsterdam: Springer. [GF]


Woods, John and Dov Gabbay, 1999, Ad baculum is not a fallacy,” in ISSA 4: 221–4. [AB]


__. 1982c, “Question-begging and cumulativeness in dialectical games,” *Nous*, 16: 585-605. [BQ]


Wreen, Michael J., 1987a, “When no reason is good reason,” in Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, et al., 1987b, 56-64, [on the *ad ignorantiam*]. [AI]

—, 1987b, “Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus,” *Informal Logic* 9: 31-9, [on the *ad baculum*]. [AB]


—, 1988b, “May the force be with you,” *Argumentation*, 2: 425-40, (on the *ad baculum*). [AB]


Yoos, George, 1975, “A critique of van de Vate’s ‘the appeal to force’,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 8: 172-6. [AB]

Zagar, Igor, and Dima Mohammed, 2011, “Fallacies: do we ‘use’ them or ‘commit’ them? or: is all our life just a collection of fallacies?” *OSSA* 9. [GF-N]


Zenker, Frank, 2016, “The polysemy of ‘fallacy’—or ‘bias’, for that matter,” *OSSA* 11. [GF]